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ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE STANDING: THE 
NOT VERY REVOLUTIONARY DECISION AT 
VALLEY FORGE 
William P. Marshall* & Maripat Flood** 
Establishment clause1 jurisprudence has traditionally involved a 
unique blend of substantive constitutional law issues and standing 
issues. Flast v. Cohen,2 for example, remains the only establishment 
clause case where the Supreme Court has granted standing to tax-
payers.3 In contexts other than taxpayer suits, such as the school 
prayer cases;' the decisions of the Court evoked almost as much con-
troversy with respect to the standing issues as they did with respect 
to the merits.'1 
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1. "Congress shall make no Jaw respecting an establishment of religion ••.. " U.S. 
CONST. amend. I. 
2. 392 U.S. 83 (1968). 
3. In a few cases prior to Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), the Court, while 
not specifically addressing the issue of taxpayer standing, granted standing to federal taxpay-
ers sub silentio. See, e.g., Wilson v. Shaw, 204 U.S. 24 (1907) (challenge to payment of fed-
eral funds for construction of Panama Canal); Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906) (chal-
lenge to monetary grant to railroads as revenue measure unconstitutionally originating in 
Senate). Since Frothingham, the Court has consistently refused to grant taxpayer standing 
where plaintiffs assert generalized grievances in the public interest or allege general unconsti-
tutionality. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974) (plain-
tiffs denied citizen and taxpayer standing to challenge armed forces reserve membership of 
United States congressmen); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974) (federal tax-
payer denied standing to challenge CIA expenditures reporting). 
4. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (classroom Bible reading held uncon-
stitutional); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (classroom reading of state-prepared prayer 
held unconstitutional). 
5. Compare Brown, Quis Custodiet lpsos Custodes?-The School-Prayer Cases, 1963 
SuP. CT. REV. 1, 15-33 with Kurland, The Regents' Prayer Case: "Full of Sound and Fury, 
Signifying . .. ", 1962 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 19-22. See generally Association of Data Processing 
Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151 (1970) ("Generalizations about standing to sue 
are largely worthless as such."); Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc. v. 
63 
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The reason that issues of standing and establishment share a 
unique heritage is not esoteric. The peculiar generalized nature of 
the establishment prohibition6 has led to procedural issues that are 
not present in circumstances where an individual is more easily dis-
cernible as the beneficiary of a constitutional protection.7 In an es-
tablishment clause case, the principal beneficiary is often the society 
or community as a whole.8 While in a few cases a litigant may 
suffer particularized injury as a result of an establishinent violation,9 
HEW, 619 F.2d 252, 255-58 (3d Cir. 1980) (general discussion of complexities and ambigui-
ties inherent in Supreme Court standing cases). 
6. A "generalized grievance" has been defined as one in which the harm asserted by the 
particular litigant as a basis for standing is "shared in substantially equal measure by all or a 
large class of citizens." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975); see Schlesinger v. Reserv-
ists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 221-27 (1974); United States v. Richardson, 418 
U.S. 166, 188-97 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring). It is not entirely clear whether a party seek-
ing to litigate such a grievance must be denied standing by the Court on the ground that his 
claim would not present a justiciable "case or controversy" under article III of the Constitu-
tion, see Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 227; Richardson, 418 U.S. at 174-80, or whether the Court 
may, pursuant to article III, hear such a claim, but may also refuse to do so for prudential or 
self-restraint reasons. See Warth, 422 U.S. at 499. The better view, however, is that restraints 
on standing to litigate generalized grievances are prudentially based. The most recent Court 
cases discussing the article III-prudential dichotomy have so indicated. See Valley Forge 
Christian College v. Americans United for the Separation of Church and State, Inc., 102 S. 
Ct. 752, 760 (1982); Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979); 
Warth, 422 U.S. at 499 (citing, inter a/la, Schlesinger and Richardson); Richardson, 418 U.S. 
at 188-97 (Powell, J., concurring). See also Note, The Generalized Grievance Restriction: 
Prudential Restraint or Constitutional Mandate?, 70 GEO. L.J. 1157 (1982) (generalized 
grievance restriction should be viewed as prudential). 
Under this view, the individual injury to the litigant in a generalized grievance case would 
allow him, standing alone, to clear the "injury-in-fact" standing barrier implicit in the article 
III "case or controversy" requirement, so that the Court could hear the litigant's claim if it so 
chose. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2; Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 
(1973); Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151-54 
(1970). However, the Court may also choose in such a situation to exercise prudential self-
restraint and refuse to grant standing. The rationale usually given for doing so in the genera-
lized grievance context is that because the litigant shares his injury with all other members of 
the particular governmental entity involved the more appropriate forum for redress of his 
grievance is the political process. See, e.g., Richardson, 418 U.S. at 179; id. at 191-97 (Powell, 
J., concurring). 
For an examination of the generalized grievance issue as it is implicated in the establish-
ment context, see infra notes 122-46 and accompanying text. 
7. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 430-31 (1961). See generally Bogen, 
Standing up for Flast: Taxpayer and Citizen Standing to Raise Constitutional Issues, 67 KY. 
L.J. 147, 170-71 (1978) (establishment clause violations may occur without an easily identifi-
able "victim"). 
8. See infra notes 136-46 and accompanying text. 
9. See, e.g., Larson v. Valente, 102 S. Ct. 1673 (1982) (claim of discriminatory treat• 
ment by imposition of reporting requirements on certain religious organizations); Epperson v. 
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (challenge by public school biology teacher to state law making 
teaching of evolution in state-supported schools a criminal offense); McGowan v. Maryland, 
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these cases are the exception rather than the rule.10 
The application of standing limitations to establishment con-
cerns has serious implications for substantive establishment issues. 
Stringent standing limitations effectively can undercut the nonestab-
lishment mandate. Similarly, the instances where standing to allege 
an establishment clause violation has been allowed indicate as much 
about the Court's understanding of establishment as they do about 
its concept of standing.11 Thus, the determination of who has stand-
366 U.S. 420 (1961) (challenge to Sunday closing law based on economic injury to specific 
storeowners suffered from operation of the law). 
10. In the majority of establishment cases, the litigants have been taxpayers or persons 
advancing generalized claims. See, e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (state tax-
payers challenging state financial aid grants to sectarian non-public schools); Meek v. Pit-
tenger, 421 U.S. 349 (197S) (state taxpayer challenging state grant of "auxiliary services" and 
loans of textbooks to sectarian non-public schools); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious 
Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 7S6 (1973) (state residents and taxpayers challenging various aid 
programs to sectarian non-public schools); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (city 
property owner challenging city property tax exemption for property owned by religious orga-
nizations); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (federal taxpayers challenging attempt by Con-
gress to provide financial aid for religious and sectarian schools); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 
U.S. 203 (1963) (state taxpayer challenging state program of Bible reading in public schools); 
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (state taxpayer challenging attempt by state to 
reimburse parents of sectarian non-public school children for transportation costs). 
11. The Court's pattern of relaxing standing requirements in order to reach establish-
ment issues indicates the importance with which the Court views the establishment clause. 
Two cases in particular evidence this approach. In Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968), 
the Court allowed a school teacher to challenge the enforcement of a law proscribing the 
teaching of evolution in the public schools, although the state had never undertaken to enforce 
the statute and there was no evidence it intended to do so. Id. at 109-10 (Black, J., concur-
ring). Additionally, it was unclear at the time the Court heard the case whether the teacher in 
question was still employed by a school district in the state. Id. at 110 (Black, J., concurring). 
The teacher was joined by a parent who alleged an interest in having his two sons "be in-
formed of all scientfic theories and hypotheses," id. (Black, J., concurring), but there was no 
evidence indicating that the parent-intervenor's sons had not been taught about evolution, nor 
even that the sons were still in high school. Id. (Black, J., concurring). Despite the plaintiffs' 
apparent failure to allege any injury caused to them by the statute, the Supreme Court agreed 
to hear the case. 
In a more recent case, Larson v. Valente, 102 S. Ct. 1673 (1982), the Court assumed for 
the purposes of litigation that plaintiffs constituted a religious organization and, therefore, had 
standing to challenge, as an establishment clause violation, a law which allegedly disfavored 
certain religious organizations in the granting of exemptions from state law requiring certain 
filing and reporting of charitable contributions. The Court proceeded on this assumption de-
spite the fact that the organization had not shown that it was, in fact, religious in nature. Id. 
at 1689-90 (Stevens, J., concurring). Indeed, the Court noted that the state could require the 
organization to prove its religious claim within the meaning of the Act in order to obtain an 
exemption. Id. at 1689 n.30 (plurality opinion). 
Reasoning that certain enforcement actions undertaken by the state indicated that the 
state had considered plaintiff's organization to be religious, the Court held those actions to 
bind the state in establishing plaintiff's standing to bring the case. Id. at 1680-81 (plurality 
opinion). Even assuming that the state enforcement action had implicitly recognized the liti-
66 HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW (Vol. 11:63 
ing to allege such a violation acts as a determination of the reach 
and meaning of the establishment proscription. 
In Valley Forge v. Americans United for the Separation of 
Church and State, Inc.,12 the Court, for the first time since 1952,13 
denied an establishment clause challenge for lack of standing. The 
majority opinion in Valley Forge was severely criticized by three dis-
senting Justices for retreating from the nonestablishment constitu-
tional mandate. 14 Whether the dissent was correct in its characteri-
zation of the majority opinion is unclear and necessitates an inquiry 
into both standing and establishment issues. 
This article examines the relationship of standing and establish-
ment in the cases prior to Valley Forge in order to determine 
whether that case, in fact, does signify a retreat from the earlier 
cases. To accomplish this purpose, we will not question the theoreti-
cal soundness of the Court's current standing approach in circum-
stances other than establishment.15 Rather, we begin with the 
Court's formulation of the two-part standing inquiry as announced in 
Warth v. Seldin,16 which requires that in order to be granted stand-
ing a litigant must satisfy both prudential and constitutional limita-
tions.17 We conclude that previous establishment cases and Valley 
gant's nature as being religious, the Court's conclusion that such action is binding on the state 
for standing purposes is surprising; it has been firmly held in other contexts that parties may 
not avoid the standing requirement by stipulation. See Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. 
Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975); Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 
U.S. 24 (1974). 
12. 102 S. Ct. 752 (1982). 
13. See Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429 (1952). 
14. See 102 S. Ct. at 780 (Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, JJ., dissenting). 
15 Several commentators have criticized the Court's current approach to standing. See 
generally Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article Ill: Perspectives on the "Case or Contr<r 
versy" Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297 (1979) (the Court should articulate the policy 
justifications for its standing determinations); Currie, Misunderstanding Standing, 1981 SuP. 
CT. REV. 41; Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court-A Functional Analysis, 86 HARV. L. 
REV. 645 (1973) (advocating a liberalization of standing rules); Tushnet, The New Law of 
Standing: A Plea/or Abandonment, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 663 (1977) (arguing that a litigant 
who can adequately present the case should be allowed standing unless a better plaintiff is 
available). 
16. 422 U.S. 490 (1975). 
17. Id. at 498. See also Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99-100 
(1979); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 80-81 (1978). The 
constitutional limitation requires a litigant to show that he has suffered some threatened or 
actual injury resulting from the putatively illegal action, and that judicial action would redress 
this injury. See e.g., Warth, 422 U.S. at 501; Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 
U.S. 26, 38 (1976). According to the Warth Court, prudential limitations embody two require-
ments: First, policies of self-restraint dictate that the court must normally refuse to review a 
matter in which the asserted harm is a "generalized grievance" shared in substantially equal 
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Forge may be reconciled under the Warth test without signifying a 
retreat from previous establishment principles. The acknowledged 
difficulty with this conclusion is that the Valley Forge Court did not 
clearly articulate the theoretical basis for its judgment. 
Part I of this article provides a brief overview of the Valley 
Forge opinions. Part II examines the development of taxpayer stand-
ing under the establisbment clause prior to Valley Forge. In Part 
III, the unique nature of an establishment clause "injury" is ex-
plored. Finally, Part IV examines the implications of the Valley 
Forge decision within this context. 
I. THE Valley Forge OPINIONS 
The Valley Forge plaintiffs, members of Americans United for 
the Separation of Church and State ("Americans United"), were a 
group of federal taxpayers and citizens interested in preserving the 
constitutional separation of church and state.18 They challenged a 
transfer of surplus government property19 by the Department of 
Health, Education and Welfare to a religious school.20 Americans 
United did not allege injury as residents of Pennsylvania or of the 
community surrounding the property at issue; they had never used, 
and did not allege that they ever intended to use, the disputed prop-
erty .21 In fact, they only learned of the government's grant of land to 
Valley Forge through a news release.22 They instead asserted federal 
taxpayer standing and claimed injury by "the deprivation of the fair 
and constitutional use of their tax dollars" in violation of the estab-
lishment clause.23 
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously agreed that 
measure by all or a large class of citizens. 422 U.S. at 499; see supra note 6. Second, the 
litigant must assert only his own legal rights and interests and may not assert the legal rights 
or interests of third parties. Warth, 422 U.S. at 499-500. 
18. Because Americans United had alleged no injury to itself as an organization, the 
majority in Valley Forge made it quite clear that "[the organization's] claim to standing can 
be no different from those of the members it seeks to represent." Valley Forge, 102 S. Ct. at 
761 n.14. Thus, for the remainder of this article, discussion will focus on the standing claims of 
the members of Americans United as individuals. 
19. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) was authorized by stat-
ute to transfer surplus government property to educational institutions at a discount. 40 U.S.C. 
§ 484(K)(l)(A), (C) (1976). Pursuant to this statutory authority, HEW conveyed 77 acres of 
surplus government real property to Valley Forge Christian College at a 100% discount (free). 
See Valley Forge, 102 S. Ct. at 755-56. 
20. 102 S. Ct. at 756-57. 
21. Id. at 766-67. See infra notes 155-60 and accompanying text. 
22. Id. at 756-57. 
23. 102 S. Ct. at 757. 
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Americans United had standing.24 The majority predicated standing 
on a theory of a "shared personal grievance,"25 holding that the es-
tablishment clause vested in the United States citizenry rights of 
standing not present in other contexts. Anticipating the argument 
that such a right was simply a generalized grievance, the court 
stated that the establishment clause "arguably" created a shared in-
dividual right to a government that does not establish religion and 
that the invasion of this right was a shared personal grievance suffi-
cient to meet the article III injury requirement.28 
Justice Rosenn, concurring, based standing for Americans 
United on an additional theory. He stated that federal citizens 
should be granted standing to allege establishment clause violations 
by the federal government to satisfy the need for an available plain-
tiff and to insure enforcement of the establishment clause.27 More-
over, he viewed Americans United as the best available plaintiffs to 
vindicate the unique establishment clause values at stake, in part be-
cause of the organization's promotion of both religious liberty and 
the constitutional principle of separation of church and state.28 
The Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit's decision.29 
First, however, it resolv~d a preliminary issue before directly ruling 
on standing. Prior to Valley Forge, it was unclear whether the fed-
eral taxpayer nexus requirement articulated in Flast v. Cohen was a 
24. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc. v. HEW, 619 F.2d 252, 
254 (3d Cir. 1980), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 752 (1982). The district court denied standing on the 
ground that plaintiffs failed to allege an injury beyond a generalized grievance. Civil Action 
No. 77-1321 (E.D. Pa. December 15, 1978) (unpublished opinion). For a thorough discussion 
of the Third Circuit opinion, sec Frieber, Americans United for Separation of Church and 
State, Inc. v. HEW: Standing to Sue Under the Establishment Clause, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 975 
(1981). 
25. 619 F.2d at 265. 
26. Id. This argument was anticipated and rejected by Justice Harlan in Flast v. Cohen, 
392 U.S. 83, 129 n.18 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting): "Freedom from establishment is a right 
that inheres in every citizen, thus any citizen should be permitted to challenge any measure 
that conceivably involves establishment." 
27. 619 F.2d at 267-68 (Rosenn, J., concurring). 
28. Id. at 268. Justice Rosenn's "available plaintiff" approach was rejected by the Su-
preme Court in Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 227 (1974) 
and in United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974). Commentators have argued 
that a well-qualified and interested plaintiff, such as a public interest group, should be granted 
standing to challenge disputed actions without having to demonstrate injury. See, e.g., Bogen, 
supra note 7, at 154; Tushnet, The Sociology of Article /II: A Response to Professor 
Ori/mayer, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1698 (1980). An inquiry into the ability or expertise in similar 
litigation of the putative plaintiff, however, has never been recognized to be a part of the 
standing inquiry. 
29. 102 S. Ct. 752, 768 (1982). 
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wholly distinct inquiry from the Warth standing inquiry or was in-
stead subsumed within the Warth framework.30 The Court, in Duke 
Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, lnc.,31 touched 
upon but failed to resolve this question. 32 In Duke, an environmental 
organization, a labor union, and a number of individuals who lived 
near a nuclear power plant challenged the constitutionality of the 
Price-Anderson Act without alleging taxpayer standing. The issue in 
Duke was whether, in addition to meeting the Warth test, the plain-
tiffs were required to demonstrate a connection between the injuries 
they claimed and the constitutional rights being asserted-the 
"nexus" required of federal taxpayers in Flast.33 The Duke Court 
held that the Flast standing inquiry had no application outside of 
taxpayers' suits.34 There was no discussion in Duke about whether 
30. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). The Court explained the required nexus: 
The nexus demanded of federal taxpayers has two aspects to it. First, the 
taxpayer must establish a logical link between that status and the type of legislative 
enactment attacked. Thus, a taxpayer will be a proper party to allege the unconsti· 
tutionality only of exercises of congressional power under the taxing and spending 
clause of Art. I, § 8, of the Constitution. It will not be sufficient to allege an inci· 
dental expenditure of tax funds in the administration of an essentially regulatory 
statute. This requirement is consistent with the limitation imposed upon state-tax-
payer standing in federal courts in Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 429 
(1952). Secondly, the taxpayer must establish a nexus between that status and the 
precise nature of the constitutional infringement alleged. Under this requirement, 
the taxpayer must show that the challenged enactment exceeds specific constitu-
tional limitations imposed upon the exercise of the congressional taxing and spend-
ing power and not simply that the enactment is generally beyond the powers dele-
gated to Congress by Art. I, § 8. When both nexuses are established, the litigant 
will have shown a taxpayer's stake in the outcome of the controversy and will be a 
proper and appropriate party to invoke a federal court's jurisdiction. 
Id. at 102-03. The Flast decision and its relationship to establishment issues is discussed infra 
notes 79-84 and accompanying text. 
Prior to Valley Forge, it was unclear whether this Flast test was part of the Warth consti-
tutional inquiry or a prudential limitation. Professor Tribe opted for the latter view, L. TRIBE, 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-22, at 97 n.2 (1978), as did Professor Frieber, Frieber, 
supra note 24, at 1001 (F/ast test was exception to prudential limitation against generalized 
grievances). 
31. 438 U.S. 59 (1978). 
32. This ambiguity was apparent from the Court's statement: 
We ... cannot accept the contention that, outside the context of taxpayers' suits, a 
litigant must demonstrate something more than injury in fact and a substantial like-
lihood that the judicial relief requested will prevent or redress the claimed injury to 
satisfy the "case or controversy" requirement of Art. III. 
Id. at 79 (footnote omitted). 
33. Id. at 78-79. 
34. Id. at 79. The Court has recognized that the standing inquiry under both Flast and 
Warth is designed to determine whether the litigant has a sufficient personal stake in the 
outcome of the litigation. The issue was how the Court derived this determination. In Schles-
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the Flast and Warth approaches were two mutually exclusive tests 
(the former applicable to taxpayer suits and the latter to all other 
cases) or simply parts of the same inquiry. 
In Valley Forge, the Court subsumed the F/ast requirements for 
taxpayer standing within the first prong of the Warth test.311 The ar-
ticle III injury required by Warth and suffered by the taxpayer in a 
Flast-type case, is the increased tax burden, however slight, caused 
by the allegedly unconstitutional exercise of congressional power 
under the taxing and spending clause of article I, section 8 of the 
Constitution.36 Having reduced F/ast to a portion of the Warth in-
quiry, the Court then addressed Americans United's claim of tax-
payer standing. 
The Court accomplished this in short order. It found that 
Americans United failed the first prong of Flast for two reasons: The 
source of the group's complaint was not Congressional action but an 
executive decision of HEW, and the transfer of surplus government 
property was effected pursuant to the "property clause"37 and not 
the taxing and spending clause of article 1, section 8.38 The invita-
tion to extend F/ast to cases where article 1, section 8 powers were 
not at issue was declined.39 According to the Court, the definition of 
injury in a taxpayer suit must be the harm suffered by a taxpayer 
inger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 227-28 (1974), Justice Burger 
treated the Flast inquiry as separate and distinct from the constitutional inquiry. Similarly, 
the Court in Valley Forge recognized this ambiguity: 
(l]t has not always been clear in the opinions of this Court whether particular fea-
tures of the "standing" requirement have been required by Art. III ex proprio 
vigore, or whether they are requirements that the Court itself has erected and which 
were not compelled by the language of the Constitution. 
102 S. Ct. at 758 (citing Flast). 
35. 102 S. Ct. at 762. 
36. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. The injury allegation pertinent to the Warth article III 
injury-in-fact requirement was described in Valley Forge as the "deprivation of the fair and 
constitutional use of [Americans United's] tax dollar." 102 S. Ct. at 761. This is appropriate, 
since it is this type of violation which injures the taxpayer qua taxpayer. That is, the plaintiff 
is harmed as a taxpayer by the increased tax burden, however slight, occasioned by the chal-
lenged statute. With respect to the second portion of the Warth article III standing test, a 
decision holding the challenged Jaw unconstitutional presumably would redress the injury by 
preventing the challenged misuse of the litigant's tax dollars. See supra note 17 and accompa-
nying text. 
37. "The Congress shall have Power to dispose of ... the Territory or other Property 
belonging to the United States .••. " U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
38. 102 S. Ct. at 762. The Court stated that according to Flast, taxpayer standing was 
confined to challenges to exercises of congressional power. Id. 
39. Id. at 762-63. Specifically, it was argued that taxpayer standing should be available 
to challenge governmental action under the property clause, art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. See supra note 
37. 
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qua taxpayer when his tax burden is increased. The Court dismissed 
the attempt to construe the government's grant of surplus property 
as an increased tax burden, observing that any effect on the plain­
tiffs' taxes was "at best speculative and at worst nonexistent."40 
After narrowly construing the F/ast taxpayer requirements as 
requiring an additional tax burden, the Court considered whether 
Americans United had standing apart from their taxpayer status 
based on the unique nature of the establishment injury alleged. The 
Supreme Court rejected the lower court's construction of a shared 
personalized right created by the establishment clause.41 It held that 
no new analytic tools need be formulated to decide the citizen stand­
ing issue; the only tools to be utilized were the article III and pru­
dential requirements first announced in Warth.42 The argument that 
a broader rule should be fashioned for establishment claims was 
squarely rejected by Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, who 
stated that there was no "hierarchy of constitutional values or . . . 
'sliding scale' of standing. "43 Nothing inherent in the establishment 
clause, according to Rehnquist, dictated an exemption to allow 
standing where no injury to the taxpayer was shown.44 Thus, the 
Flast case did not allow specialized rules of establishment standing 
in the absence of actual injury. 
It was undoubtedly critical to the Court's treatment of Flast 
that F/ast was incorporated within the Warth framework. In Flast, 
the taxpayer claim survived the constitutional hurdle because the al­
legation of unconstitutional government conduct under the establish­
ment clause was coupled with the necessary allegation that the plain­
tiff /taxpayer suffered a financial injury, however slight, in his status 
as taxpayer as a result of the challenged expenditure.415 The fact that 
there was an additional tax levy in F/ast which satisfied the Warth 
injury requirement, and no such injury in Valley Forge46 was deter-
40. 102 S. Ct. at 763 n.17.
41. Id. at 763-67. The Court declared that the "assertion of a right to a particular kind
of government conduct, which the government has violated by acting differently, cannot alone 
satisfy the requirements of Art. III without draining those requirements of meaning." Id. at 
764. 
42. Id. at 765-66.
43. Id. at 765.
44. The Court expressly rejected the Third Circuit's ''view of standing under which the
Art. III burdens diminish as the 'importance' of the claim on the merits increases." Id. at 764-
65. For a discussion of why the ideology embodied in the establishment clause may merit
special treatment, see Frieber, supra note 7, at 1005-08.
45. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 103 (1968).
46. The transfer of surplus property may have actually saved the federal government
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minative for standing. That both cases concerned the establishment 
clause was inapposite. Justice Rehnquist observed that the establish-
ment clause violation alleged by Americans United amounted to no 
more than an assertion of the plaintiff's right to have the government 
comply with the establishment mandate.47 He did not see that Amer-
icans United had "alleged an injury of any kind, economic or other-
wise, sufficient to confer standing. "48 
The dissenters in Valley Forge took issue with the majority's 
application of Flast. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall 
and Blackmun, began by noting that the existence of an article III 
injury "often turns on the nature and source of the claim asserted. "49 
In Brennan's view, the majority erred by failing to consider whether 
the establishment clause itself defined an injury and created a cause 
of action for the redress of that injury.110 Summarizing F/ast and 
Frothingham v. Mellon/1 Brennan concluded that "[t]he taxpayer 
was the direct and intended beneficiary of the prohibition on 
financial aid to religion,"112 and as such was "a singularly 'proper 
and appropriate party to invoke a federal court's jurisdiction' to 
challenge a federal bestowal of largesse as a violation of the Estab-
lishment Clause."113 Brennan then strongly criticized. the majority's 
attempt to distinguish F/ast as involving congressional action, rather 
than the executive action complained of in Valley Forge, finding that 
"[t]he First Amendment binds the Government as a whole."114 The 
majority's attempted distinction of F/ast based on the difference be-
tween the taxing and spending clause and the property clause was 
dismissed as equally unpersuasive.1111 Brennan observed that there 
money, see Valley Forge, 102 S. Ct. at 763 n.17. In any event, no allegation of spending was 
made. 
47. "Although [Americans United] claim that the Constitution has been violated, they 
claim nothing else." Id. at 765. 
48. Id. at 766 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). 
49. Id. at 769 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting) (citing 
Warth, 422 U.S. at 500). 
50. The Court makes a fundamental mistake when it determines that a plaintiff 
has failed to satisfy the two-pronged "injury-in-fact" test, or indeed any other test 
of "standing," without first determining whether the Constitution or a statute de-
fines injury, and creates a cause of action for redress of that injury, in precisely the 
circumstance presented to the Court. 
Id, (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
51. 262 U.S. 447 (1923). 
52. 102 S. Ct. at 775 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). 
53. Id. at 778 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
54. Id. at 779 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
55. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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could be no constitutional difference between the government's gift 
of cash to a religious group to build a facility, and the government's 
gift of a facility already constructed:56 
Justice Stevens' dissent also sharply criticized the majority's at-
tempted distinction of Flast.51 Stevens stated: "For the Court to hold 
that plaintiffs' standing depends on whether the Government's trans-
fer was an exercise of its power to spend money, on the one hand, or 
its power to dispose of tangible property, on the other, is to trivialize 
the standing doctrine."58 Stevens' dissent went even further than 
Brennan's, reasoning that Flast attached special importance to es-
tablishment values which negated any artificial distinction between 
grants of money under the spending clause and grants of property 
under the property clause. 59 
Thus, the question that remains unanswered in Valley Forge is 
whether the opinion heralded a new retreat from judicial enforce-
ment of the nonestablishment mandate. The majority did not charac-
terize its opinion as a retreat and purported to distinguish and not 
overrule cases such as Flast.60 In order to evaluate the majority 
opinion we must begin with an understanding of earlier doctrine in 
the establishment clause area. It is to these cases that we now turn. 
II. PRE-Valley Forge EsTABLISHMENT STANDING 
The Court first recognized establishment clause standing in 
Bradfield v. Roberts.61 In Bradfield, the Court recognized standing 
in a municipal taxpayer to challenge on establishment grounds the 
use of federal funds to construct a religiously affiliated hospital in 
the District of Columbia. Treating the District of Columbia as a mu-
nicipality, 62 the Court found that allegations of unconstitutional ex-
penditures of funds provided a sufficiently direct and immediate in-
jury to the taxpayer to warrant standing.63 Bradfield, however, broke 
56. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
51. Id. at 780 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
58. Id. 
59. Id. at 781 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
60. Id. at 761-63. 
61. 175 U.S. 291 (1899). The paucity of establishment and free exercise cases resulted 
because, until Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), the free exercise clause was held 
inapplicable to the states; the establishment clause was first applied to the states in Everson v. 
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
62. The explanation of Bradfield as a municipal taxpayer case is articulated more 
clearly in Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 486 (1923), than it is in Bradfield itself. 
63. 175 U.S. at 295. Brennan's dissent in Valley Forge argued that Bradfield did not 
depend upon this characterization. The taxpayer in Bradfield was a federal taxpayer; thus, 
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no new ground. The Court's treatment of taxpayer standing for a 
District of Columbia resident in the establishment context was con-
sistent with municipal taxpayer standing in other contexts which 
have established a litigant's peculiar concern in the affairs of his 
community.6" 
The Court began to expand establishment standing concepts in 
Everson v. Board of Education.65 In Everson, the Court recognized 
that a school district taxpayer had standing66 to challenge a New 
Jersey statute that authorized the Board of Education to reimburse 
parents for money spent to bus their children to parochial schools.67 
Everson was the first case in which taxpayer standing was recog-
nized based upon allegations of unconstitutional state governmental 
expenditures in violation of the establishment clause.68 As such, the 
case was a minor expansion of the rule in Bradfield, extending estab-
lishment standing to state as well as municipal taxpayers. Everson 
was significant, however, in its efforts to relate taxation to establish-
ment concerns. The Court stated: "No tax in any amount, large or 
small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, 
whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to 
teach or practice religion."69 
After Everson, the Court expanded state taxpayer standing to 
Brennan argued, federal taxpayer standing was established. 102 S. Ct. at 770 n.7 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). 
64. See, e.g., Donnelly v. Lynch, 51 U.S.L.W. 2289 (1st Cir., Nov. 11, 1982) (upholding 
municipal taxpayer's right, after Valley Forge, to contest on establishment grounds the city's 
construction of a religious nativity display on private property); Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 
U.S. 447, 486 (1923) (taxpayer's interest in municipal expenditures is sufficiently direct and 
immediate to warrant standing); Crampton v. Zabriskie, 101 U.S. 601, 609 (1879) (recogniz-
ing taxpayers' right to invoke the jurisdiction of a court of equity to prevent an illegal disposi-
tion of municipal monies). 
65. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
66. The Court accepted jurisdiction of an appeal from the state supreme court's decision 
upholding the validity of the statute. Nothing in the Court's decision intimates the slightest 
doubt that the Court had jurisdiction to review the case. See id. at 4. 
67. The funds actually expended were part municipal and part state revenues. Since the 
Everson plaintiff was a municipal taxpayer and since municipal revenues were expended, Ever-
son was, in fact, only a slight expansion of Bradfield. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 5 n.3. 
68. State taxpayer actions were heard by the Court in other contexts prior to Everson. 
See, e.g., Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221 (1920) (Court expressing no reservation of the ques-
tion of standing when a taxpayer sued the Secretary of the State of Ohio to enjoin the printing 
of ballots for a referendum as a wasteful expenditure of public funds); Heim v. McCall, 239 
U.S. 175, 187 (1915) (Court explicitly assuming that the state taxpayer had "a right of suit" 
and passing to the merits of a claim challenging the constitutionality of a state statute which 
provided that only American citizens could be employed in the construction of public works). 
69. 330 U.S. at 16. 
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reach a situation involving minimal, if any, tax expenditure.70 In Illi-
nois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education,71 a litigant challenged 
a release time program in his community's public school. Weekly 
religion classes taught by private religious teachers were held during 
the release time on public school premises for students whose parents 
requested the instruction; nonparticipating students received secular 
instruction in other parts of the building. Standing purportedly was 
based upon the plaintiffs' status as taxpayers, residents of the com-
munity and parents of school children attending the public school.72 
Justice Black dispensed with the standing issue in one sentence: "A 
second ground for the motion to dismiss is that the appellant lacks 
standing to maintain the action, a ground which is also without 
merit."73 The absence of any showing that the program actually re-
quired financial expenditure was overlooked by the majority but did 
not fail to escape the attention of Justice Jackson in his concurrence. 
He observed, "Any cost of this plan to the taxpayers is incalculable 
and negligible .... " 74 In a later case,75 the Court explained Mc-
Collum as having involved actual expenditures, but the record in the 
case itself is not clear and the existence or nonexistence of any ex-
penditure clearly was not crucial to the finding of standing. 
Despite any suggestion in McCollum to the contrary, Everson 
later was limited briefly to cases involving actual expenditures.76 In 
Doremus v. Board of Education,77 the Court refused to grant stand-
ing to a taxpayer challenging the practice of Bible reading in a pub-
lic high school. The Court distinguished Doremus from Everson on 
the ground that the Bible reading in Doremus had involved no ex-
70. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
71. 333 U.S. 203 (1948). 
72. Id. at 205. 
13. Id. at 206 (citation omitted). 
14. Id. at 234 (Jackson, J., concurring). Justice Jackson concurred in the opinion despite 
his conclusion that the taxpayer qua taxpayer suffered negligible harm. Id. 
75. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 309 (1952). The characterization in Zorach was 
not made pursuant to a standing inquiry, but was part of the effort of the Zorach majority to 
distinguish McCo/lum on the merits. 
16. See supra notes 54-62 and accompanying text. 
77. 342 U.S. 429 (1952). Plaintiffs had challenged as violative of the establishment 
clause a New Jersey statute in the New Jersey state courts. No trial was held and the New 
Jersey Supreme Court disposed of the case on the merits, despite "jurisdictional doubts." Id. 
at 430-31. The New Jersey Supreme Court observed that the plaintiffs had failed to allege 
that implementation of the statute resulted in any additional expenditures, or that participa-
tion in the statutory scheme violated the plaintiffs' religious beliefs. 5 N.J. 435, 439, 75 A.2d 
880, 881-82 (1950). 
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penditure of state funds.78 Thus, the message of Doremus was clear: 
Actual expenditures levying an actual burden on the taxpayer liti-
gant were necessary to create taxpayer standing. 
The establishment injury to the taxpayer as taxpayer received 
its most expansive acknowledgment in Flast v. Cohen.79 The plain-
tiffs in that case were granted standing as federal taxpayers to chal-
lenge the disbursement of funds to religious and sectarian schools by 
federal officials pursuant to the Elementary and Secondary Educa-
tion Act of 1965.80 It is incorrect to view F/ast itself as a leading 
establishment opinion.81 Almost all of the F/ast majority opinion was 
concerned with the permissiblity of federal taxpayer suits gener-
ally. 82 But the Court, as it had done previously in Everson, empha-
sized the essential relationship between tax expenditures and estab-
lishment. The Court's discussion of establishment is as follows: 
[A]ppellants have alleged that the challenged expenditures violate 
the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amend-
ment. Our history vividly illustrates that one of the specific evils 
feared by those who drafted the Establishment Clause and fought 
for its adoption was that the taxing and spending power would be 
used to favor one religion over another or to support religion in 
general. James Madison, who is generally recognized as the leading 
architect of the religion clauses of the First Amendment, observed 
in his famous Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious As-
sessments that 'the same authority which can force a citizen to con-
tribute three pence only of his property for the support of any one 
establishment, may force him to conform to any other establish-
ment in all cases whatsoever.' 2 Writings of James Madison 183, 
186 (Hunt ed. 1901). The concern of Madison and his supporters 
was quite clearly that religious liberty ultimately would be the vic-
tim if government could employ its taxing and spending powers to 
aid one religion over another or to aid religion in general. The Es-
tablishment Clause was designed as a specific bulwark against such 
potential abuses of governmental power, and that clause of the 
First Amendment operates as a specific constitutional limitation 
78. 342 U.S. at 434. 
79. 392 U.S. 83 (1968). 
80. Id. at 85, 106. The two-part nexus standing requirement for federal taxpayers ar-
ticulated in Flast is set out supra note 30. 
81. The majority's discussion of establishment was limited to a very brief overview of the 
history of the establishment clause. 392 U.S. at 103-06. The peculiar nature of establishment 
was discussed in the concurrence by Justice Fortas. Id. at 115-16 (Fortas, J., concurring). 
82. Flast also addressed the propriety of convening a three-judge court under the cir-
cumstances presented. Id. at 88-91. 
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upon the exercise by Congress of the taxing and spending power 
conferred by Art. I, § 8.83 
77 
Despite the Court's caution in tying taxpayer standing to actual 
expenditures in Everson, Doremus, and Flast, this line eventually be-
gan to break down in subsequent non-federal establishment taxpayer 
cases.84 In Walz v. Tax Commission,85 the Court granted standingt 
without discussion, to a property owner to challenge the property tax 
exemption of religious organizations. No governmental expenditure 
was involved in the Walz case; indeed, the Court made a point in 
reaching its decision on the merits to distinguish such a tax exemp-
tion from an actual expenditure.86 The fact that no expenditure was 
involved was critical to the Court's finding that the exemption was 
constitutional.87 The Court did not explain why the fact that the 
challenged action was a tax exemption as opposed to an expenditure 
was constitutionally significant with respect to the merits but was not 
constitutionally significant to the standing issue. 
If the line drawn by Everson, Doremus, and F/ast is the line 
between expenditures and non-expenditures, then Walz presents a 
modification of this theory. It may be argued that the program in 
Walz resulted in an economic benefit to the religious organization.88 
But the fact that the religious organization enjoys an economic bene-
fit is unimportant for taxpayer standing purposes. The focus for 
standing purposes in Doremus, F/ast, and Everson was on the expen-
diture by the state, and its resultant burden on the taxpayer, not on 
the purported benefits received by the religious institution. 
A further expansion of taxpayer standing occurred in Hunt v. 
McNair.89 The plaintiff, a South Carolina taxpayer, challenged the 
validity of a statutory scheme that provided for the issuance of reve-
83. Id. at 103-04 (footnotes omitted). 
84. Individual Justices, including Justice Fortas concurring in Flast, had suggested that 
the fact that the constitutional claim was establishment would be enough to break down tradi-
tional standing barriers. 392 U.S. at 115. This, however, was not the rationale announced by 
the Flast majority, a point which Justice Rehnquist recognized, see Valley Forge, 102 S. Ct. 
at 767 n.25. 
85. 397 U.S. 664 (1970). 
86. Id. at 675, (Brennan, J., concurring). 
87. Id. See also id. at 690-91 (Brennan, J., concurring). The Court distinguished be-
tween a passive benefit, which is equated with benevolent neutrality, and an actual affirmative 
grant which would implicate the establishment concern. This distinction was also noted by 
Justice Brennan in Valley Forge, 102 S. Ct. at 775 n.15. 
88. Indeed, the Court in Walz recognized that such an economic benefit would result. 
397 U.S. at 674-75. 
89. 413 U.S. 734 (1973). 
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nue bonds for construction projects.90 The challenged law prohibited 
grants to construct buildings that would be used by sectarian institu-
tions for sectarian instruction or as a place for religious worship. The 
statute also prohibited grants for any facility that was to be used 
primarily in connection with any part of the program of a divinity 
school or department for any religious denomination. Under the stat-
utory scheme, bonds could be issued, however, to a sectarian college 
for the construction of buildings not devoted to sectarian purposes. 
In p.pplying this program, South Carolina approved a revenue bond 
for a Baptist college at Charleston, South Carolina. Holding the law 
constitutional on the merits, the Court relied heavily on the fact that 
the issuance of this revenue bond involved no state expenditure. The 
Court explained the program as follows: 
The "state aid" involved in this case is of a very special sort. We 
have here no expenditure of public funds, either by grant or loan, 
no reimbursement by a State for expenditures made by a parochial 
school or college, and no extending or committing of a State's 
credit.91 
Since there was no expenditure of funds in Hunt, and therefore no 
increased burden on the taxpayers, the case did not meet the Ever-
son-Doremus-Flast framework for standing. One might expect, 
therefore, that this very basis upon which the Hunt Court found the 
law constitutionafon the merits might have been used to deny stand-
ing. The Court, however, ignored the standing issue. 
Another indication that the Supreme Court had relaxed the Ev-
erson-Doremus-Flast rule in taxpayer cases is implicit in the paro-
chial aid cases. 92 If one begins with the assumption, as the Court 
seemed to do in Committee for Public Education and Religious Lib-
erty v. Nyquist,93 that parochial aid programs encourage parents to 
90, Id. at 73S-36. 
91. Id. at 74S n.7. 
92. See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 
(1980); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); 
Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 7S6 (1973); Lemon v. 
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968); Everson v. 
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. I (1947). 
A parochial aid case involves a challenge to a program designed to aid, through grants, 
loans, gifts of valuable property, or other pecuniary assistance, sectarian non-public schools; 
such aid is normally state or municipally funded. 
93, 413 U.S. 7S6, 77S (1973). The Court stated, "Of course, it is true [that financial aid 
programs] ... served indirectly and incidentally to promote the religious function by render-
ing. it more likely that children would attend sectarian schools ..•. " Id. · 
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send their children to parochial schools, then an immediate question 
develops as to whether taxpayers as taxpayers are harmed at all by 
such programs;94 it is at least possible that such programs might ease 
the strain on public school enrollment and, thus, would save the tax-
payer money in the long run. If the theoretical basis for allowing 
taxpayer standing in establishment cases is the drain upon the tax-
payer's pocketbook caused by the allegedly unconstitutional expendi-
ture, then the parochial aid cases seemingly would not support a 
finding of standing. Nonetheless, the right of a state taxpayer to 
challenge parochial programs at this time is unquestioned. 
What is most significant about these establishment clause-state 
taxpayer cases is that the Court has not expanded standing to simi-
larly situated litigants in other nonestablishment contexts. Except for 
Walz, the Supreme Court has never recognized the right of a tax-
payer to attack the favorable tax treatment of another taxpayer.95 
It also is questionable whether the parochial aid cases such as 
Nyquist and Sloan v. Lemon survive the current standing test. In 
Warth v. Seldin,96 and Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights 
Organization,97 the Court stringently required the litigant to show 
that he was actually harmed by the challenged action.98 If the harm 
recognized in the state taxpayer cases is an unconstitutional increase 
in the tax burden, then it would appear that the litigant would have 
to show this harm under the Warth-Simon test. Yet it is clear that 
in establishment cases such as Nyquist, Sloan, Hunt and Walz, no 
94. Id. at 765. See also Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 829 (1973) (citing legislative 
findings of the state of Pennsylvania that the parochial aid program would result in a saving of 
taxpayer money). 
95. The Court expressly found this to be an open question in Simon v. Eastern Ky. 
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 36-37 (1976). See also Louisiana v. McAdoo, 234 U.S. 627 
(1914) (denying standing to the state of Louisiana to challenge the allegedly too-favorable 
tariff rates imposed on imported sugar by the federal government). The Court also denied 
standing in a case not involving an establishment claim but otherwise factually similar to Hunt 
v. McNair, supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text. See Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 
U.S. 464 (1938) (taxpayer does not have standing to challenge the constitutionality of a fed-
eral program of grants and loans to municipal corporations). In Ickes, the Court reasoned that, 
absent a showing of injury, a federal taxpayer has no standing to challenge federal expendi-
tures on the ground that the expenditures are for an unconstitutional purpose. Id. at 478. Ickes 
thus may be viewed as inconsistent with F/ast, in which the Court held that a federal taxpayer 
will have standing to challenge federal expenditures as unconstitutional where the taxpayer 
satisfies the two-part nexus showing articulated in Flast. See supra notes 30, 74-78 and ac-
companying text. 
96. 422 U.S. 490 (1975). 
97. 426 U.S. 26 (1976). 
98. 426 U.S. at 38-39; 422 U.S. at 498-501. 
80 HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:63 
such showing was made. Thus, some cognizable injury other than a 
higher tax burden or unconstitutional tax expenditure must be inher-
ent in these cases. 
The search for this "other injury" begins with another group of 
establishment cases in which the harm suffered by the litigant is not 
immediately clear. These are the cases where the Court has author-
ized standing for parents of public school children to challenge prac-
tices within the public school that allegedly violate the establishment 
clause. 
Parent standing was initiated in Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. 
Board of Education99 and in Zorach v. Clauson.100 In those two 
cases, litigants attacked the constitutionality of release time pro-
grams in schools attended by their children, basing their standing 
claim on their status as taxpayers and as parents of school children. 
McCollum is ambiguous as to which of the two bases supported 
standing.101 Zorach apparently was based on parental standing since 
the Court, in its only discussion of standing, simply distinguished 
Doremus on the ground that parents of school children were not 
plaintiffs in that case;102 it is unclear what harm suffered by the par-
ents in M cCollum and Zorach justified standing. Indeed, the state-
ment by Justice Jackson in McCollum that no compulsion was 
placed on the non-participating student and that no penalty was ap-
plied to such a student was not questioned by the majority.103 None-
theless, the Court granted standing to parents in McCollum and in 
Zorach despite the apparent failure of the parents in either case to 
allege specific injury in their status as parents. 
Parental standing reached its most dramatic impact in the 
school prayer cases. In Engel v. Vitale,104 the Court invalidated a 
voluntary school prayer program in which a nondenominational 
prayer composed by the New York Board of Regents was recited in 
New York's public schools.105 The Engel plaintiffs were parents of 
99. 333 U.S. 203 (1948). 
JOO. 343 U.S. 306 (1952). 
IOI. The Court summarily dismissed the standing argument without discussion. 333 
U.S. at 206. For a discussion of McCollum and taxpayer standing, see supra notes 71-75 and 
accompanying text. 
I 02. The discussion of standing in Zorach was confined to a footnote. The Court stated, 
"No problem of this Court's jurisdiction is posed in this case since, unlike the appellants in 
[Doremus] appellants here are parents of children currently attending schools subject to the 
released time program." 343 U.S. at 309 n.4. 
103. 333 U.S. at 233 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
104. 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
105. Id. at 436. The prayer at issue was: "Almighty God, we acknowledge our depen-
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children attending the public schools, as well as citizens of New 
York and taxpayers of the school district where the specific chal-
lenged acts took place.106 The plaintiffs' standing was not challenged, 
and the Court was silent on the subject.107 In the lower court, stand-
ing was predicated on a free exercise claim that the children and 
parents were being coerced in violation of their religious beliefs.108 
The free exercise claim, dismissed summarily by the lower court, 
was abandoned upon appeal,109 however, and the only issue remain-
ing was the alleged violation of the establishment clause principle of 
separation of church and state. 110 With respect to this issue, the par-
ents failed to allege any injury to themselves or their children and 
did not charge that the prayer program involved any expenditure of 
state funds. The Court's willingness to reach the merits of their es-
tablishment claim, despite the parents' failure to allege specific in-
jury, raises a question as to the basis on which standing was 
granted.111 
That question remained unanswered in 1963 when the Court 
faced a challenge to a Bible reading program in Pennsylvania's and 
dence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our Coun-
try." Id. at 422. 
106. See In re Engel v. Vitale, 10 N.Y.2d 174, 179, 176 N.E.2d 579, 579-580, 218 
N.Y.S.2d 659, 660 (1961), rev'd, 310 U.S. 421 (1962). 
107. See 310 U.S. at 421-26. For a discussion of the possible bases for standing in En-
gel, see Brown, supra note 5; Sutherland, Establishment According to Engel. 76 HARV. L. 
REV. 25 (1962). 
108. In re Engel v. Vitale, 10 N.Y.2d 174, 179-80, 176 N.E.2d 579, 579-80, 218 
N.Y.S.2d 659, 660 (1961), rev'd, 310 U.S. 421 (1962). 
109. See Brief for Petitioners at 3, Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (free exercise 
claim not included as a "question presented"). 
rule: 
llO. 370 U.S. at 424. 
111. Professor Kurland has observed that Engel apparently established a new standing 
[W]here the alleged violation of the separation clause has occurred by reason of 
activities within the public school, a parent of a child attending the school has 
standing to raise the issue in the federal courts without showing any compulsion 
exerted on his child to comply with or to participate in the activities about which 
complaint is made. The result is perhaps desirable, for it permits a very limited class 
to exert the powers of a watchdog to keep the schools . . . free from the imposition 
of religious indoctrination. It is hard to see, however, why the parents are a better 
group to exercise this power of surveillance than other citizens .... To state a re-
quirement of direct, individual, economic interest and, nevertheless, to sustain juris-
diction where no such interest is shown is to forswear a major function of judicial 
opinions: to enlighten the litigants and those who may follow them about the rules 
that the Court is applying. 
Kurland, supra note 5, at 22. See also Frieber, supra note 24, at 986-87 (Engel represents a 
liberalized view of standing); Sutherland, supra note 107, at 27. (Engel indicates a relaxation 
of establishment standing requirements, since the Engel plaintiffs suffered no palpable injury). 
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Maryland's public schools in the consolidated cases of School Dis-
trict v. Schempp112 and Murray v. Curlette.113 The Schempp plain-
tiffs were parents of public school children and the Murrays were 
atheists. The Court sustained jurisdiction and struck down the pro-
. grams.114 The standing issue was relegated to a footnote. The text of 
the footnote is as follows: 
It goes without saying that the laws and practices involved here can 
be challenged only by persons having standing to complain. But 
the requirements for standing to challenge state action under the 
Establishment Clause, unlike those relating to the Free Exercise 
Clause, do not include proof that particular religious freedoms are 
infringed. The parties here are school children and their parents, 
who are directly affected by the laws and practices against which 
their complaints are directed. These interests surely suffice to give 
the parties standing to complain. 1115 
The Court distinguished Doremus, "which involved the same 
substantive issues presented here,"116 by stating that the school child 
involved in Doremus had graduated, thus denying the appellants pa-
rental standing; in addition, the Doremus appellants had failed to 
establish taxpayer standing.117 The statement in the Schempp-Mur-
ray majority's footnote118 that no coercion was needed to trigger the 
litigants' standing was critical to the granting of standing there since 
there was no finding in either case that the challenged Bible reading 
actually coerced the litigants' children. The fact that no coercion was 
found, however, would seem to indicate that whatever harm was suf-
fered by the plaintiffs' children was undifferentiated from that of 
other members of the involved communities. As Professor Brown has 
explained, the litigants may have had a grievance due to a difference 
of opinion with respect to the prayer requirement119-a disagreement 
so marked that the litigants incurred the expense of a lawsuit. But if 
this was the sole ground for litigation, it is, as Professor Brown ex-
plains, a "'reason' [which] disclosed nothing of significance for 
standing."120 The undifferentiated nature of such a claim apparently 
112. 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
113. Id. 
114. Id. at 20S. 
11S. Id. at 224 n.9 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
116. Id. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. 
119. Brown, supra note 5, at 23. 
120. Id. See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176-77 (1974) (organization's 
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would fail the prudential "generalized grievance" barrier erected by 
Warth.121 
Thus, the question why standing was allowed for the school chil-
dren's parents in these cases and in the Walz-Hunt line of cases, 
where the challenged enactment levied no additional tax burden on 
the litigant taxpayer, remains unanswered. Because no injury was 
shown in either the parent or the non-expenditure taxpayer cases, it 
would seem that a dismissal for lack of standing would be required 
under article III. 122 
Even if there is some injury implicit in the recognition of stand-
ing in the above cases sufficient to satisfy the article III requirement, 
the claims in all of these cases, including Flast and Everson, by their 
very nature are generalized grievances. As Justice Harlan has ex-
plained, taxpayer's suits such as Flast and Everson "under the estab-
lishment clause are not in these circumstances meaningfully different 
from other public actions .... The interests (the taxpayer) repre-
sents, and the rights he espouses, are, as they are in all public ac-
tions those held in common by all citizens."123 This raises the ques-
tion of why standing was not denied in all of these cases because of 
prudential concerns.1H In order to answer these constitutional and 
mere interest in issue, no matter how long-standing or fervent, is insufficient for standing); 
Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 225-26 (1974) (litigants' 
motivation to bring suit is irrelevant to standing inquiry); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 
727, 737 ( 1972) ( organization whose only interest in the litigation is its status as a "special 
interest" group may not, absent actual injury to members, have standing). 
Some commentators have disputed the Court's denial of standing to ideological plaintiffs. 
See generally Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideo-
logical Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1033, 1037-38 (1968) (uninjured, ideological plaintiff 
may present factual context which satisfies Court's need for concrete adverseness); Scott, 
Standing in the Supreme Court-A Functional Analysis, 86 HARV. L. REV. 645, 673-74 
(1973). 
121. See supra note 6. 
122. See Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 39 (1976); Warth v. 
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975). 
Professor Brown contrasted standing in nonestablishment cases with standing in the 
school prayer cases and noted the Court's liberality in the latter context. He questioned 
"whether there is any reason to support specially tenuous standing in establishment cases, and 
to modify the accepted orthodoxy accordingly." Brown, supra note 5, at 18. 
123. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 128-29 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting). See also Val-
ley Forge, 102 S. Ct. at 778 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Each, and indeed every, fed-
eral taxpayer suffers precisely the injury that the Establishment Clause guards against when 
the Federal Government directs that funds be taken from the pocketbooks of the citizenry and 
placed into the coffers of the ministry."); Bogen, supra note 7. 
124. See supra note 6. Indeed, Professor Brown has suggested that the Court might 
have been wise to decline review on prudential grounds in the school prayer cases. Brown, 
supra note 5, at 14-15. 
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prudential questions, we must first examine the establishment clause 
itself. 
III. NON-SPECIFIC INJURY UNDER THE EsTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: 
HARMS TO TAXPAYERS AND COMMUNITIES 
The dilemma that the Court has recognized with respect to the 
establishment clause is that violation of the clause does not require 
coercion on specific individuals.12G Thus, requiring specific individu-
alized injury, such as economic loss, is not appropriate in all estab-
lishment cases because, in some establishment contexts, the estab-
lishment clause is not concerned with this type of injury.126 Rather, 
it would follow that the harms against which the nonestablishment 
directive is leveled, in the contexts identified by the previous cases, 
are inherently generalized. 
The first of these contexts is the establishment concern impli-
cated in the improper use of tax monies for religious purposes. While 
it has been shown that there is n:o article III standing problem in the 
F/ast and Everson cases because the increased tax burden necessa-
rily injures the taxpayers involved, the prudential limitation is decid-
edly implicated by the generalized nature of the injury in such 
cases.127 Yet whether the Court is correct in its historical under-
standing or not, it held in Flast and in Everson that the flow of tax 
monies to religious entities was one of the specific evils that the es-
tablishment clause was designed to cure.128 Thus, it is inappropriate 
to use prudential concerns of judicial self-restraint to frustrate what 
12S. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,430 (1962). See supra notes 116-18 and accompany-
ing text. 
126. It has been asserted that "to require coercive effect for standing might render the 
[establishment] clause unenforceable." Frieber, supra note 24, at 987. 
Thus, Justice Brennan's principal argument for granting standing to parents of school 
children in Schempp was that "to deny [a parent] standing either in his own right or on behalf 
of his child might effectively foreclose judicial inquiry into serious breaches of the prohibitions 
of the First Amendment." School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 266 n.30 (1963) (Brennan, 
J., concurring). The Court, however, has consistently and firmly rejected the notion that the 
probability that an unconstitutional act will otherwise escape judicial review is alone a suffi-
cient ground on which to predicate standing for a particular complainant. Valley Forge, 102 
S. Ct. at 767; Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 227 (1974); 
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974). As Professor Brown noted, Justice 
Brennan's position "undercuts the whole orthodoxy of standing" and more significantly, may 
suggest that "judicial review is an end in itself." Brown, supra note S, at 24. The Court de-
scribed this "available plaintiff" approach as "a departure from the limits on judicial power 
contained in Art. III." Valley Forge, 102 S. Ct. at 768. 
127. See supra notes 6, 123 and accompanying text. 
128. See supra notes 6S-69, 79-83 and accompanying text. 
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the Court has found to be the framers' intent, for failure to allow 
taxpayer standing on prudential grounds will effectively insulate 
such proscribed disbursements from review. 
This is not to say that the Court has recognized that all pur-
portedly unconstitutional action must be susceptible to judicial re-
view. Indeed, it has expressly rejected that notion.129 However, in 
establishment cases, where the injury often does not create specifi-
cally aggrieved plaintiffs, and the constitutional provision at issue is 
directed at non-specific injuries, standing has been allowed.130 This is 
the lesson of Flast v. Cohen.131 
The harm at issue in the non-expenditure cases (including the 
parent and taxpayer cases) is more amorphous than is the injury to 
taxpayer qua taxpayer, but it is this harm that apparently satisfies 
both the article III standing requirements and militates against the 
Court's exercise of its prudential restraint in establishment cases. 
The harm in question is the harm to religious freedom and govern-
mental integrity that occurs in a community132 when the community 
is not free from establishment influences.133 Standing is predicated 
on the interest a litigant has in removing vestiges of establishment 
from his community. This principle was explicitly noted by Justice 
Fortas concurring in Flast. Noting the interest that "the taxpayer 
and all other citizens have in the church-state issue," he stated: "In 
terms of the structure and basic philosophy of our constitutional gov-
ernment, it would be difficult to point to any issue that has a more 
intimate, pervasive, and fundamental impact upon the life of the 
taxpayer-and upon the life of all citizens."134 
In addition to Justice Fortas, several commentators have recog-
nized harm to the community as meeting the article III "injury in 
fact" standing requirement. Frieber notes, "[t]hose who live near 
public land that is being used for religious purposes suffer a personal 
affront and may be regarded as having an individual right to avoid 
exposure to governmentally sponsored religious 'messages' and the 
129. See supra note 126. 
130. See supra notes 120, 127-28 and accompanying text. 
131. See supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
132. "Community" as used here does not refer only to small geographical entities; 
rather, it is the area purportedly affected by the establishment clause violation. In this sense, 
the term may be used in reference to an entire state. See supra notes 65-78 and accompanying 
text. 
133. A comparable "community" harm was recognized in a racial discrimination case in 
Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972). 
134. 392 U.S. at l 15 (Fortas, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
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subtle indoctrination that may result. . . . [The alleged establish-
ment] is thrust upon them as a part of their community environ-
ment. " 1311 And Professor Tribe has stated: 
[T]he fact of symbolic governmental identification with a religious 
activity must be understood to constitute a separate evil in a system 
that regards matters of religious concern as ultimately delegated to 
individual and community conscience. . . . The only way . . . to 
make sense of the Court's conclusion in Flast v. Cohen, is to recog-
nize in the religion clauses a fundamental personal right not to be a 
part of a community whose official organs endorse religious views 
that might be fundamentally inimical to one's deepest' beliefs.136 
The notion of harm to the community, although never explicitly 
discussed by the Court, is inherent in some of its other decisions. In 
McGowan v. Maryland,137 the plaintiffs challenged a Sunday closing 
law on establishment and free exercise grounds. The Court rejected 
standing based on the free exercise claim, noting that the plaintiffs 
claimed only economic injury from operation of the law, and not an 
infringement of their own religious freedom.138 The Court then 
stated: 
If the purpose of the "establishment" clause was only to insure pro-
tection for the "free exercise" of religion, then what we have said 
above concerning appellants' standing to raise the "free exercise" 
contention would appear to be true [with regard to the establish-
ment clause.] However, the writings of Madison, who was the First 
Amendment's architect, demonstrate that the establishment of a 
religion was equally feared because of its tendencies to political 
tyranny and subversion of civil authority.139 
135. Frieber, supra note 24, at 991 (footnote omitted). 
136. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-12, at 868-69 (1978) (footnote 
omitted). Even the defendant college in Valley Forge admitted that "a direct offense to the 
plaintifrs right to live and learn in a religion-free environment has been held to constitute a 
personal stake." Valley Forge, Brief for Petitioners at 17 (available on LEXIS, Genfed library, 
Sup. Ct. file). See also Brilmayer, supra note 15, at 312-13 (community interest should be 
recognized in some instances). 
137. 366 U.S. 420 (1961). 
138. Id. at 429. 
139. Id. at 430 (footnote omitted). Involvement of civil government with religion harms 
both the civil community and the religious community. "When the secular and religious insti-
tutions become [impermissibly] involved •.. there inhere [sic] in the relationship precisely 
those dangers-as much to church as to state-which the Framers feared would subvert reli-
gious liberty and the stength of a system of secular government." School Dist. v. Schempp, 
374 U.S. 203, 295 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring). As Justice Brennan pointed out in 
Schempp, for example, "public schools serve a . . . uniquely public function: the training of 
American citizens in an atmosphere free of parochial, divisive, or separatist influences of any 
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Again, in the parental standing cases such as Schempp and En-
gel, the Court implicitly recognized this substantive harm to the 
community. No actual establishment of a specific religion was found 
in the school prayer cases,140 nor were those persons who did not 
ascribe to the prayers at issue held to have been in any way coerced 
or inhibited in their own religious beliefs.141 Yet the Court, by reach-
ing the establishment claim on the merits in those -cases-, seems to be 
saying that there is an establishment injury to community members 
when a community is pervaded by a church-state relationship. A di-
rect measurable harm to specific persons may not occur in such 
cases, but the community itself suffers, perhaps symbolically,142 and 
perhaps also in the subtle effect that religious influence may have on 
later generations. 143 The community is also affected by the unwar-
ranted influence of the church and state working together upon those 
in the community who are not members of the established religion. 
As the Court recognized in Engel, an establishment of one religion 
necessarily affects the rights of others even if it did not actually 
sort-an atmosphere in which children may assimilate a heritage common to all American 
groups and religions." Id. at 241-42 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Interference with 
this function is an interference with the community's right to have only a common heritage 
taught in the public schools. Similarly, history shows, as the Court has noted, that religions 
relying on government support to spread their faiths have lost many persons' respect, see Engel 
v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962), the harm may be to the established religion itself, rather 
than to a particular individual. 
140. School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 281-82 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring); 
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. at 430. Data Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 
(1970), interpreted Schempp as recognizing standing based upon a spiritual stake in the 
outcome. 
141. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 228-29 (Douglas, J., concurring); Engel, 370 U.S. at 430. 
142. [T]he very symbolism of conspicuous governmental aid to identifiably reli-
gious enterprise is regarded as an independent evil. : .. [N]othing short of a con-
cern with such symbolism could distinguish those cases of aid to the religious enter-
prise which the Court has deemed impermissible from those which the Court has 
readily tolerated. 
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-12, at 868 (1978). It has been judicially 
recognized, at least in the school context, that even the appearance of official sponsorship of 
religious beliefs or practices is a symbolic harm, one to which the establishment clause is 
directed. "To an impressionable student, even the mere appearance of secular involvement in 
religious activities might indicate that the state has placed its imprimatur on a particular reli-
gious creed. This symbolic inference is too dangerous to permit." Brandon v. Board of Educ., 
635 F.2d 971, 978 (2d Cir. 1980). See also Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. at 431; Allen v. Morton, 
495 F.2d 65, 72-73 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
143. The parochial aid distinction between aid to colleges as opposed to aid to elemen-
tary and secondary schools appears to turn on the notion that students in the latter institutions 
are more susceptible to indoctrination by religious teachings. See Tilton v. Richardson, 403 
U.S. 672, 686 (1971) (plurality opinion). 
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serve to coerce or inhibit those persons.144 Changes in religious be-
lief, or eventual religious indoctrination because of pervasive reli-
gious influence, may be undetectable, but they are injuries decried 
by the establishment mandate nonetheless. Thus, the establishment 
clause extends beyond the individual's right to have his or her reli-
gious views respected. It encompasses the right, as a member of the 
community, to a civil authority untainted by religious influence.145 
This harm to the community may be seen as justifying the 
Court's grant of standing in the taxpayer-non-expenditure and par-
ent cases. In recognizing that state or community citizens have 
standing to bring these cases, the Court implicitly is stating that its 
understanding of establishment means that the adverse community 
effect created by unconstitutional establishment (the constitutional 
injury under Warth) extends to community and state boundaries.146 
144. 370 U.S. at 430-31. 
145. Recognition of the community interest as a basis for standing also is seen in estab-
lishment cases predicated upon a beneficial interest theory. Beneficial interest centers on a 
plaintiff's right to have government property used for permissible, i.e., public, purposes. In 
Allen v. Hickel, 424 F.2d 944, 946-47 (D.C. Cir. 1970), the court granted standing to plain-
tiffs to challenge the construction of a creche, erected as part of a Christmas pageant, on 
federal park land, holding that "a claim that park land which plaintiff has a beneficial right be 
maintained for public purposes is being devoted to the use of an established religion is suffi-
cient personal involvement to provide standing." Id. at 947. Plaintiffs were residents of the 
District of Columbia metropolitan area, the area specifically served by the park lands involved. 
Id. Thus, the court allowed community members to complain of an establishment violation 
simply as members of the affected community entitled "to enjoy the park land and its devotion 
to permissible public use," id., with no further allegation of injury. (The court, having found 
standing on a beneficial interest theory, did not reach plaintiffs' assertion of taxpayer standing. 
Id. at 946.) Cf. Baird v. White, 476 F. Supp. 442, 445 (D. Mass. 1979) (standing granted to 
plaintiff "as a resident of Boston" to challenge city's permitting Archdiocese of Boston to limit 
access to Boston Commons during papal visit to those holding tickets issued by the Archdio-
cese). It is not required in beneficial interest cases that the litigant allege that his actual use of 
the property is being denied. If such deprivation of use were alleged, standing would be predi-
cated on direct injury such as that found in United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory 
Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669 (1973). 
146. This grant of standing to community residents is in turn consistent with the com-
munity notions of standing recognized in the early municipal taxpayer cases. See, e.g., Froth-
ingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 486-87 (1923); Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221 (1920); 
Cramptom v. Zabriskie, IOI U.S. 601 (1879). These cases apparently recognized a special 
concern that a citizen has in the activites of his community over and above that which a citizen 
might have in the actions of the national government generally. The cases also recognize that 
the affected community may depend upon the type of violation alleged. If the measure in 
question is authorized by state law or otherwise has a statewide scope, then standing normally 
has been granted to residents of the state generally. See Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 
(1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) (plurality opinion) (standing granted to 
Connecticut residents attacking expenditures made within the state under a federal statute). If 
however, the practice in question is localized within a specific community, only those commu-
nity residents or those in proximate relation to the community would have standing. See 
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In addition, in not exercising its prudential restraint despite the 
generalized nature of the grievances in such cases, the Court is rec-
ognizing, as it did in Flast, that prudential limitations are inappro-
priate when such limitations would necessarily frustrate the purposes 
of the constitutional enactment.147 Since the purpose of nonestab-
Iishment is to protect the community generally, standing should not 
be -denied simply because the litigant suffered a harm undifferenti-
ated from those suffered by other members of that community. 
IV. Valley Forge: AN ATTEMPT AT RECONCILIATION 
The pre-Valley Forge establishment cases discussed in the pre-
vious section show that the Court has found actual injury sufficient 
to satisfy article III standing requirements in two circumstances 
where differentiated injury to specific individuals was not alleged. 
The Court found actual harm (1) to taxpayers, when revenues raised 
in part from that taxpayer were expended in violation of the estab-
lishment clause, and (2) to a taxpayer-resident or parent-resident of 
a community when a purportedly unconstitutional establishment oc-
curred in that resident's community. Further, it apparently was rec-
ognized that given the intrinsic generalized nature of an establish-
ment claim, it would be inappropriate to exercise prudential standing 
limitations in such cases, because to do so would mean that the es-
tablishment clause would be rendered unenforceable in the very situ-
ations in which the provision was designed to apply. 
Given this analysis, one might easily wonder why standing was 
denied in Valley Forge. The answer with respect to taxpayer stand-
ing is not difficult. Valley Forge took the majority opinion in Flast at 
its word. The requisite injury in federal taxpayer cases, according to 
Flast, is a harm to the taxpayer qua taxpayer-a burden levied on 
the taxpayer by the illegal expenditure of funds by Congress from 
Doremus v. Board of Educ. 342 U.S. 429 (1952). In the public school cases, the aggrieved 
community appears to be the students attending the public schools and their parents. See 
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). Al-
though the school prayers at issue in Doremus were authorized by a state statute, standing was 
not granted to state taxpayers. Doremus may be seen either as a definition of affected commu-
nity or as an indication that the Court, in some circumstances, may require that a plaintiff be 
from a narrowly defined community, even though under the analysis presented here a broader 
community (e.g., a state) might satisfy article III concerns. 
147. The Court's decision whether to exercise its prudential restraint to deny standing 
often turns on consideration of the policies involved, unlike the Court's standing inquiry under 
article III. See supra note 6. In the establishment context, this means that the Court should 
consider the policies underlying the establishment clause and refuse to exercise prudential re-
straint where those policies would be frustrated. 
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tax revenues raised from the litigant-taxpayer.148 Since the disposi-
tion of surplus property in Valley Forge did not involve any tax ex-
penditures by Congress, the Flast test was not satisfied.149 
It is less clear why the Valley Forge Court denied standing with 
respect to the litigants' interest in assuring that their community 
would be free of establishment influence. Much depends on whether 
the Court's basis in denying standing was constitutional or pruden-
tial. This distinction is critical, 1110 yet the Court is highly ambiguous 
on this point. For example, at some points in the opinion the Court 
appears to base its decision on the litigants' failure to allege "an 
injury of any kind. " 1111 This language, together with the Court's fre-
quent references to article III, 1112 seem to indicate that Americans 
148. Valley Forge, 102 S. Ct. at 762. 
149. Id. 
150. A brief aside is appropriate at this point. For purposes of brevity and clarity it has 
been assumed that the simple interest in having the government act constitutionally does not 
amount to harm sufficient to maintain standing under article III. A strong argument can be 
made, however, that this type of harm is another variation of what the courts have referred to 
as a "generalized grievance" and that limits on standing to bring such a grievance as a claim 
generally are derived from prudential concerns. This argument is best supported by a reference 
to the two cases that the Court most often points to as examples of generalized grievances, 
Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974), and United States v. 
Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974). In Schlesinger particularly, the plaintiffs' interest appears 
to be no more than that the government act constitutionally. (Justice Stewart dissenting in 
Richardson points out that in that case another interest may have been at issue as well-the 
right to receive information regarding CIA expenditures. 418 U.S. at 203). Yet the Court, 
despite language to the contrary in the cases themselves, has viewed Schlesinger and Richard-
son as prudential cases. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at 499-500. 
Even if the interest in having the government act constitutionally is construed as a "gener-
alized grievance" that does satisfy article III requirements, this type of generalized grievance 
is distinguishable qualitatively from the taxpayer or community harm recognized in the estab-
lishment cases. The harms present in the latter circumstances, while generalized, are pecu-
liarly establishment injuries. They are less abstract than the generalized interest in having the 
government act constitutionally, an interest presumably present in every constitutional case, 
establishment or otherwise. This "injury" has never been held sufficient to grant standing, even 
in establishment cases, regardless of whether the denial of standing can be described as based 
upon prudential or article III concerns. Thus, even assuming that the interest in having the 
government act constitutionally does state a generalized grievance sufficient to satisfy article 
III, the Court could not exercise its prudential restraint in this type of "generalized" case 
without intruding upon previous cases. Actual injury to the plaintiff's taxpayer or community 
interests would not be implicated, only the "psychological consequence presumably produced 
by observation of conduct with which one disagrees." Valley Forge, 102 S. Ct. at 765. 
151. Id. at 765. 
152. "[T]he 'cases and controversies' language of Art. III forecloses the conversion of 
courts of the United States into judicial versions of college debating forums." Id. at 759. "The 
Court of Appeals was surely correct in recognizing that the Art. III requirements of standing 
are not satisfied by 'the abstract injury in nonobservance of the Constitution asserted by ... 
citizens.'" Id. at 764 quoting Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 
1982) ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE STANDING 91 
United would not have had standing based upon the constitutional 
concerns. On the other hand, the Court heavily relies upon United 
States v. Richardson153 and Schlesinger v. Reservist Committee to 
Stop the War154 in its holding. Both Richardson and Schlesinger 
have been held to have rested on the prudential standing limita-
tion.155 Thus, if Valley Forge was based upon these decisions, it 
would (appear that Valley Forge was a prudential limitation case. 
A finding that the Valley Forge plaintiffs did not meet article 
III standing requirements would not be a retreat from previous deci-
sions. The only claim present in Valley Forge was the claim that the 
surplus property had been distributed in violation of the establish-
ment clause. The plaintiffs had no relationship with the purportedly 
unconstitutional granting of property other than reading about it in 
the newspaper.156 No desire to use the disputed property was al-
leged;157 no injury to residents of the community where the disputed 
property was located was alleged;158 no claim of improper use of tax 
dollars was at issue.159 Americans United alleged merely that they 
were federal taxpayers and citizens attacking a federal action that 
was not national in scope and that did not result in an added tax 
burden. No establishment claim had ever succeeded on this basis.160 
As noted previously, earlier comparable establishment cases, 
223 n.13 (1974). See also 102 S. Ct. at 759, 760, 766 n.24, 768. 
153. 418 U.S. 166 (1974). 
154. 418 U.S. 208 (1974). 
155. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499-500 (1975). See supra note 6. 
156. 102 S. Ct. at 756-57. 
157. Id. at 757. 
158. Americans United did claim that some of its members resided in Pensylvania but 
did not allege that those members suffered a cognizable injury as residents of Pennsylvania 
which differed in any way from the injury they or any of the non-resident members allegedly 
suffered as federal citizens. Id. at 76 n.23. 
159. The plaintiffs did allege that their members would be "depriv[ed) of the •.. con-
stitutional use" of their tax dollars by the conveyance, id. at 761, but the Court rejected this 
claim as failing the first prong of the Flast nexus test because the transfer did not actually 
involve any expenditure of tax dollars. Id. at 762. 
160. One might argue that this did occur in Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) 
(plurality opinion), where the Court accorded standing to challenge federal construction grants 
and loans to church-related colleges where a portion of the statute did not involve expendi-
tures. However, the portion of the statute which did not involve expenditures-it allowed the 
property built with the grant or loan to revert to the school after 20 years, even if the condi-
tions of the grant or loan were unfulfilled at that point-may simply have been seen by the 
Court as tied to the challenged expenditures so as to allow the taxpayers standing to challenge 
both. 102 S. Ct. at 779 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In Valley Forge, petitioners made no chal-
lenge whatsoever to the original expenditure that resulted in the government's ownership of the 
disputed land. 
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where no injury to taxpayer qua taxpayer was shown, had required a 
showing of harm to the litigant as a member of the community actu-
ally affected by the unconstitutional action. Americans United, 
therefore, could only have suffered the requisite harm if they had 
alleged injury caused to them as members of an affected community. 
The sole community in which they alleged status, however, was the 
federal community. Thus, they were asking the Court to hold that 
any federal action implicating the establishment clause affected the 
entire nation and, derivatively, all its citizens, regardless of localized 
nature of the action. This holding would be an expansion from pre-
vious establishment cases that had recognized only local or state 
communities as the aggrieved entities.161 Although the Court could 
have held that the affected community was the nation as a whole, it 
apparently chose not to do so. 
If Valley Forge rests on article III grounds, the opinion may be 
read as simply stating that the national community did not have a 
cognizable interest in localized establishment clause violations. Once 
this was established, the conclusion followed that the Valley Forge 
plaintiffs' claim was not in any way distinguishable from the claim 
of a citizen expressing an interest in having the government act con-
stitutionally .162 The Court was correct, therefore, according to prece-
dent in characterizing the only injury of the Valley Forge plaintiffs 
as the psychological injury caused by the "observation of conduct 
with which one disagrees."168 
There are problems with this limited reading of Valley Forge. 
A serious criticism is that such a reading of the breadth of the af-
fected community in an establishment case turns the historical un-
derstanding of the establishment clause on its head. The clause as 
originally enacted was intended to apply only to the federal govern-
ment and not to the states.1" Thus, describing the community af-
fected by the establishment as being the state and not the nation 
161. See supra notes 6S-78 and accompanying text. 
162. See supra note ISO. 
163. Valley Forge, 102 S. Ct. at 76S. 
164. See School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 253 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) 
("No one questions that the Framers of the First Amendment intended to restrict exclusively 
the powers of the Federal Government."); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 46S (1961) 
(opinion of Frankfurter, J.) ("'fhe purpose of the Establishment Clause was to assure that the 
national legislature would not exert its power in the service of any purely religious end.") 
(emphasis added). See also Permoli v. New Orleans, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 588, 609 (1845); Bar-
ron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247 (1833). 
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seems clearly contradictory to the intent of the framers.165 Moreover, 
the action at issue in Valley Forge was an action taken by the fed-
eral government. This suggests the arbitrariness of construing state 
lines as the boundary for those persons who will be adversely af-
fected for standing purposes. 
Still, there is support for the position that the state or commu-
nity resident, and not the federal taxpayer. is the proper plaintiff 
even when federal action is at issue. The resident's concern in the 
activities of his municipality, over and above his interest in the ac-
tions of the federal government, was a cornerstone of the Supreme 
Court's distinction of Bradfield v. Roberts in the Frothingham opin-
ion.166 An expansion of the concept of community to include the 
state in certain, but not all, contexts167 may be viewed as a limited 
outgrowth of the Bradfield rule.168 This limited expansion of Brad-
field is consistent with Tilton v. Richardson.169 In Tilton, standing 
was not questioned when a federal expenditure which occurred in 
Connecticut was attacked as an establishment violation by federal 
taxpayers who additionally alleged standing as Connecticut re-
sidents.110 Further, this position may explain why in Roemer v. 
Board of Public Works,171 the same plaintiffs as in Valley 
Forge-Americans United for the Separation of Church and 
State-were dismissed by the district court from an action challeng-
165. See Valley Forge, 102 S. Ct. at 776 n.17 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Scott, supra 
note 120, at 662. 
166. See Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 486-87 (1923) (distinguishing Bradfield 
v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899)). 
167. For examples of cases where the state has been included in the community concept, 
see Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973) (granting taxpayer standing to challenge state's 
authority to issue revenue bonds benefiting Baptist-controlled college); Everson v. Board of 
Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (granting taxpayer standing to challenge state statute authorizing 
reimbursement to parents for transportation of children attending parochial schools). For an 
example of where the state has not been included in the community concept, see Doremus v. 
Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429 (1952) (denying standing to parents and taxpayers to challenge 
state statute providing for Bible reading in public schools). 
168. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text. 
169. 403 U.S. 672 (1971). 
170. Tilton v. Finch, 312 F. Supp. 1191, 1194 (D. Conn. 1970) (standing granted), rem. 
sub nom. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 676 (1971). If the program attacked in Valley 
Forge had been national in scope, such as a nationwide religious school tuition tax deduction 
scheme, or a national bill requiring prayer in the public schools, injury to a federal resident as 
resident that would at least satisfy the article III injury requirement could not be doubted. 
However, there is merit to the common sense notion that an out-of-state resident who has no 
relationship to a particular community is not injured by, and thus has no standing to litigate, 
an issue which is the peculiar concern of that community. 
171. 426 U.S. 736 (1976). 
94 HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:63 
ing the constitutionality of a state law under the establishment 
clause although standing was granted to in-state taxpayers.172 The 
dismissal was noted by the Supreme Court, without comment, when 
it decided the Roemer case.173 
The Valley Forge opinion would become more troubling if the 
Court had found that the plaintiffs' interest was more than simply 
the interest in having the government act constitutionally. This find-
ing would indicate that the plaintiffs actually were harmed as mem-
bers of an affected community. If the Court then exercised its pru-
dential restraint by holding that the plaintiffs, because of the 
generalized nature of their alleged injury, should not be granted 
standing, it would be retreating from precedents such as Flast and 
Everson which can be read as recognizing that judicial self-restraint 
in establishment cases is not warranted.174 
In terms of fulfilling the nonestablishment mandate, the conclu-
sion that Valley Forge was decided on article III grounds is the bet-
ter course. If Valley Forge is viewed as an article III decision, a 
member of Americans United might have been granted standing if 
he had alleged injury specifically as a member of a community prox-
imate to the property at issue.176 Indeed, if such a plaintiff alleged 
that he had actually used, or desired to use, the property in question, 
then United States v. SCRAP, 176 and Sierra Club v. Morton177 sug-
172. Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 387 F. Supp. 1282, 1284 n.l (D. Md. 1975), 
ajf'd, 426 U.S. 736 (1976) (plurality opinion). Americans United were denied standing along 
with the American Civil Liberties Union. They alleged only that they "share[d] as common 
objectives the preservation of separation of church and state and opposition to use of public 
funds for the support of sectarian, educational institutions." Appendix to Jurisdictional State-
ment at 7. 
173. Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 744 n.8 (1976) (plurality opinion). 
174. In both cases, which involved what seem clearly to be "generalized grievances", the 
Court reached the merits. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 
U.S. l (1947). See supra notes 65-69, 79-83 and accompanying text. 
175. Although the Supreme Court has never considered this question in the context of 
the establishment clause, several lower federal courts have granted standing to local residents 
residing near the site of an alleged establishment violation. See Allen v. Hickel, 424 F.2d 944, 
946-47 (D.C. Cir, 1970) (granting standing to challenge use of public property for religious 
purposes based on the theory that the plaintiffs had a beneficial interest in the use of the 
property); Anderson v. Salt Lake City Corp., 475 F.2d 29, 31 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 
U.S. 879 (1973); Baird v. White, 476 F. Supp. 442 (D. Mass. 1979); See supra note 140. See 
a/so Frieber, supra note 24, at 1007-08. 
176. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 
412 U.S. 669, 686-87 (1973) (standing appropriate where plaintiffs allege they will be injured 
in their use of the property at issue). The Court "made it clear that standing is not to be 
denied simply because many people suffer the same injury". Id. at 687. 
177. 405 U.S. 727, 735 (1972) (denying standing to challenge government action that 
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gest that standing would have been found on the basis of a direct 
harm without implicating prudential concerns. In any event, the Val-
ley Forge Court itself indicated that these factors would be relevant: 
Respondants complain of a transfer of property located in Chester 
County, Pennsylvania. The named plaintiffs reside in Maryland 
and Virginia; their organizational headquarters are located in 
Washington, D.C. They learned of the transfer through a news re-
lease. Their claim that the government has violated the Establish-
ment Clause does not provide a special license to roam the country 
in search of governmental wrongdoing and to reveal their discover-
ies in federal court.178 
If, in fact, standing could be rectified by inclusion of a plaintiff who 
had a direct relationship with the Valley Forge community, then 
Valley Forge may be explained as the definition of community in 
establishment clause cases as something less than the federal com-
munity and not as a retreat from the Court's previous decisions in 
enforcing the nonestablishment mandate. Unfortunately, on this 
critical point, the Valley Forge opinion is unclear; thus further clari-
fication of this point by the Court will be necessary. 
V. CONCLUSION 
On the one hand, the Valley Forge majority opinion can be read 
as a clear signal that the Court has not retreated from the injury-in-
fact requirement for standing in the establishment context. The 
Court assumed that a showing of injury-in-fact was necessary to es-
tablish a "case or controversy" under article III, and implicitly rec-
ognized the importance of a consistent interpretation of "case or con-
troversy" that would not vary with the right or constitutional 
provision at issue. The Court refused to expand previous cases to 
hold that a federal taxpayer-citizen might be injured by a localized 
federal establishment violation. Earlier cases that had recognized 
establishment injury to federal taxpayers and/or local community 
members had never found injury to plaintiffs in circumstances simi-
lar to those in Valley Forge. 
On the other hand, the Valley Forge Court's opinion was defi-
cient in its failure to clearly articulate the grounds for the holding. 
There is at least the implication in Valley Forge that the Court, ex-
allegedly resulted in environmental injury to certain property where plaintiffs alleged no use of 
the property at issue). 
178. 102 S. Ct. at 766 (footnotes omitted). 
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ercising its prudential restraint, has elected not to enforce the 
nonestablishment mandate even though it would be constitutionally 
permissible to do so. Viewed from this perspective, the decision 
would represent a significant retreat from precedent. The earlier 
cases were correct in not applying prudential limitations to establish-
ment issues since to do so would effectively preclude judicial review 
of injuries at the heart of the establishment proscription. 
In summary, consistency and policy require that Valley Forge 
be read as stating that the plaintiffs were not injured by the chal-
lenged action, rather than as stating that, although injured, pruden-
tial concerns precluded judicial review. Under this reading, the Su-
preme Court's enforcement of the establishment clause would retain 
its vitality. 
